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BLACK BOX, WHITE ARROW
ALEXANDRE BOROVIK AND S¸U¨KRU¨ YALC¸INKAYA
Abstract. The present paper proposes a new and systematic approach to the
so-called black box group methods in computational group theory. Instead of
a single black box, we consider categories of black boxes and their morphisms.
This makes new classes of black box problems accessible. For example, we can
enrich black box groups by actions of outer automorphisms.
As an example of application of this technique, we construct Frobenius
maps on black box groups of untwisted Lie type in odd characteristic (Sec-
tion 6) and inverse-transpose automorphisms on black box groups encrypting
(P)SLn(Fq).
One of the advantages of our approach is that it allows us to work in
black box groups over finite fields of big characteristic. Another advantage
is explanatory power of our methods; as an example, we explain Kantor’s
and Kassabov’s construction of an involution in black box groups encrypting
SL2(2n).
Due to the nature of our work we also have to discuss a few methodological
issues of the black box group theory.
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1. Introduction
Black box groups were introduced by Babai and Szemeredi [4] as an idealized
setting for randomized algorithms for solving permutation and matrix group prob-
lems in computational group theory. A black box group X is a black box (or an
oracle, or a device, or an algorithm) operating with 0–1 strings of uniform length
which encrypt (not necessarily in a unique way) elements of some finite group G.
In various classes of black box problems the isomorphism type of G could be known
in advance or unknown.
This original definition of a black box group appears to have gone out of vogue
with the black box group community mostly because it is too abstract and de-
manding in the context of practical computations with matrix groups. The aim of
this paper is to refresh and expand the concept by introducing and systematically
using morphisms, that is, polynomial time computable homomorphisms of black
box groups.
This modest change allows us to apply some basic category theoretic and model
theoretic ideology. As we show in this and subsequent papers, this dramatically
expands the range of available tools for structural analysis of black box groups
and allows to solve black box problems previously not accessible to existing meth-
ods. The development of this new approach requires a detailed discussion of some
methodological issues of black box group theory.
The paper contains a number of new results, and two of them deserve highlight-
ing. They are concerned with construction of automorphisms of black box groups;
the first one is construction of Frobenius maps on black box Chevalley groups of
untwisted type and odd characteristic. This is stated and proven in Section 6.
The second—and the most important—result of the paper is the “reification of
involutions”, Theorem 7.1.
In our next work [15], these constructions are applied to recognition of black box
groups (P)SL2(q) for odd q.
Finally, we have to mention that the paper belongs to a series of works aimed
at a systematic development of methods of structural analysis of black box groups
[11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 48, 49].
2. Black box groups
2.1. Axioms for black box groups. The functionality of a black box X for a
finite group G is specified by the following axioms.
BB1 X produces strings of fixed length l(X) encrypting random (almost) uni-
formly distributed elements from G; this is done in probabilistic time poly-
nomial in l(X).
BB2 X computes, in probabilistic time polynomial in l(X), a string encrypting
the product of two group elements given by strings or a string encrypting
the inverse of an element given by a string.
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BB3 X decides, in probabilistic time polynomial in l(X), whether two strings en-
crypt the same element in G—therefore identification of strings is a canon-
ical projection
X .........
pi
- G.
We shall say in this situation that X is a black box over G or that a black box X
encrypts the group G. Notice that we are not making any assumptions of practical
computability or the time complexity of the projection pi.
A typical example of a black box group is provided by a group G generated in a
big matrix group GLn(r
k) by several matrices g1, . . . , gl. The product replacement
algorithm [25] produces a sample of (almost) independent elements from a distri-
bution on G which is close to the uniform distribution (see a discussion and further
development in [2, 3, 18, 29, 39, 41, 43, 42, 44]). We can, of course, multiply, invert,
compare matrices. Therefore the computer routines for these operations together
with the sampling of the product replacement algorithm run on the tuple of gen-
erators (g1, . . . , gl) can be viewed as a black box X encrypting the group G. The
group G could be unknown—in which case we are interested in its isomorphism
type—or its isomorphism type could be known, as it happens in a variety of other
black box problems.
The concept of a black box can be applied to rings, fields, and, in our next paper
[15], even to projective planes. We shall construct new black boxes from the given
ones, and in these constructions strings in X will actually be pointers to other black
boxes. Therefore it is convenient to think of elements of black boxes as other black
boxes—the same way as in the ZF set theory all objects are sets, with some sets
being elements of others. A projective plane constructed in our next paper [15]
provides a good example: it could be seen as consisting of points and lines, where
a “line” is a black box that produces random “points” on this line and a “point” is
a black box that produces random “lines” passing through this point.
By the nature of our axioms, all algorithms for black box groups (in the sense
of Axioms BB1–BB3) are Monte Carlo. In most applications, they can be easily
made Las Vegas if additional information of some kind is provided about X—for
example a set of its generators, that is, strings in X that represent a generating set
of G, or the isomorphism type of G.
In our subsequent papers, especially in [15], it becomes clear that the distinction
between Monte Carlo and Las Vegas probabilistic algorithms is external to the
theory of black box groups although it is quite natural in its concrete applications.
2.2. Global exponent and Axiom BB4. Notice that even in routine examples
the number of elements of a matrix group G could be astronomical, thus mak-
ing many natural questions about the black box X over G—for example, finding
the isomorphism type or the order of G—inaccessible for all known deterministic
methods. Even when G is cyclic and thus is characterized by its order, existing
approaches to finding exact multiplicative orders of matrices over finite fields are
conditional and involve oracles either for the discrete logarithm problem in finite
fields or for prime factorization of integers.
Nevertheless black box problems for matrix groups have a feature which makes
them more accessible:
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BB4 We are given a global exponent of X, that is, a natural number E such that
pi(x)E = 1 for all strings x ∈ X while computation of xE is computationally
feasible (say, logE is polynomially bounded in terms of log |G|).
Usually, for a black box group X arising from a subgroup in the ambient group
GLn(r
k), the exponent of GLn(r
k) can be taken for a global exponent of X.
One of the reasons why the axioms BB1–BB4, and, in particular, the con-
cept of global exponent, appear to be natural, is provided by some surprising
model-theoretic analogies. For example, D’Aquino and Macintyre [28] studied non-
standard finite fields defined in a certain fragment of bounded Peano arithmetic;
it is called I∆0 + Ω1 and imitates proofs and computations of polynomial time
complexity in modular arithmetic. It appears that such a basic and fundamental
fact as the Fermat Little Theorem has no proof that can be encoded in I∆0 + Ω1;
the best that has so far been proven in I∆0 + Ω1 is that the multiplicative group
F∗p of the prime field Fp has a global exponent E < 2p [28]. Under a stronger ver-
sion of bounded arithmetic, the Fermat Little Theorem is proven by Jerˇa´bek [32].
These results have to be seen in the context of the earlier work by Kraj´ıcˇek and
Pudla´k [35] who proved that Buss’ subtheory S12 does not prove the Fermat Little
Theorem if the RSA system is secure. Another result by Jerˇa´bek [31] directly links
bounded arithmetic with the black box group theory: he showed that the Fermat
Little Theorem in S12 equivalent to the correctness of the Rabin-Miller primality
testing [45], an archetypal example of a black box group algorithm.
We shall discuss model theory and logic connections of black box group theory
in some detail elsewhere.
2.3. Cartan decomposition and Axiom BB5. Our last comment on the ax-
iomatics of black box groups is an observation that in almost all our work in sub-
sequent papers Axiom BB4 can be replaced by its corollary, Axiom BB5, the latter
is closely connected to the concept of Cartan decomposition in Lie groups, see the
discussion of Cartan decomposition in [8].
BB5 We are given a partial 1- or 2-valued function ρ of two variables on X that
computes, in probabilistic time polynomial in l(X), square roots in cyclic
subgroups of X in the following sense:
if x ∈ X and y ∈ 〈x〉 has square roots in 〈x〉 then ρ(x, y) is the
set of these roots.
In particular,
• if |x| is even, ρ(x, 1) is the subgroup of order 2 in 〈x〉;
• if |x| is even, then, consecutively applying ρ(x, ·) to 2-elements in 〈x〉, we
can find all 2-elements in 〈x〉;
• if |x| is odd, and y ∈ 〈x〉 then ρ(x, y) is the unique square root of y in 〈x〉.
We emphasize that Axiom BB5 provides everything needed for construction of
centralizers of involutions by the maps ζ0 and ζ1 [9].
Axiom BB5 follows from BB4 by the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm [46, 47] applied
to the cyclic group 〈x〉.
In this paper, we assume that all our black box groups
satisfy assumptions BB1–BB4 or BB1–BB3 and B5.
We emphasize that we do not assume that black box groups under consideration
in this paper are given as subgroups of ambient matrix groups; thus our approach
is wider than the setup of the computational matrix group project [36]. Notice that
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we are not using the Discrete Logarithm Oracles for finite fields Fq: in our setup, we
start with a black box group without any access to the field over which the group is
defined. Nevertheless we are frequently concerned with black box groups encrypting
classical linear groups; even so, some of our results (such as Theorems 8.2 and 9.1)
do not even involve the assumption that we know the underlying field of the group
but instead assume that we know the characteristic of the field without imposing
bounds on the size of the field. Finally, in the case of groups over fields of small
characteristics we can prove much sharper results, see, for example, [12]. Here, it
is natural to call the characteristic p “small” if it is known and small enough for
the linear in p running time of algorithms to be feasible.
So we attach to statements of our results one of the two labels:
• known characteristic, or
• small characteristic.
Our next paper [16] is dominated by “known characteristic” results. In this one,
we also obtain some more specific results for small odd characteristics.
3. Morphisms
3.1. Morphisms. Given two black boxes X and Y encrypting finite groups G and
H, respectively, we say that a map ζ which assigns strings from Y to strings from
X is a morphism of black box groups, if
• the map ζ is computable in probabilistic time polynomial in l(X) and l(Y),
and
• there is an abstract homomorphism φ : G → H such that the following
diagram is commutative:
X
ζ- Y
G
piX
?
.........
φ- H
piY
?
.........
where piX and piY are the canonical projections of X and Y onto G and H,
respectively.
We shall say in this situation that a morphism ζ encrypts the homomorphism φ. For
example, morphisms arise naturally when we replace a generating set for the black
box group X by a more convenient one and start sampling the product replacement
algorithm for the new generating set; in fact, we replace a black box for X and deal
with a morphism Y −→ X from the new black box Y into X.
Observe that a map
G ..........
φ
- H
from a group to a group is a homomorphism of groups if and only if its graph
F = {(g, φ(g)) : g ∈ G}
is a subgroup of G×H.
At this point it becomes useful to introduce direct products of black boxes: if
X encrypts G and Y encrypts H then the black box X × Y produces pairs of
strings (x, y) by sampling X and Y independently, with operations carried out
componentwise in X and Y; of course, X×Y encrypts G×H.
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This allow us to treat a morphism
X .........
ζ
- Y
of black box groups as a black box subgroup Z ↪→ X×Y encrypting F :
Z = {(x, ζ(x)) : x ∈ X}
with the natural projection
piZ : Z −→ F
(x, ζ(x)) 7→ (piX(x), φ(piX(x)).
In practice this could mean (although in some cases we use a more sophisticated
construction) that we may be able to find strings x1, . . . , xk generating X with
known to us images y1 = ζ(x1), . . . , yk = ζ(xk) in Y and then use the product
replacement algorithm to run a black box for the subgroup
Z = 〈(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk)〉 6 X×Y
which is of course exactly the graph { (x, ζ(x)) } of the homomorphism ζ. Random
sampling of the black box Z returns strings x ∈ X with their images ζ(x) ∈ Y
already attached.
Slightly abusing terminology, we say that a morphism ζ is an embedding, or an
epimorphism, etc., if φ has these properties. In accordance with standard conven-
tions, hooked arrows
⊂ -
stand for embeddings and double-headed arrows
--
for epimorphisms; dotted arrows are reserved for abstract homomorphisms, includ-
ing natural projections
X .......
piX- pi(X);
the latter are not necessarily morphisms, since, by the very nature of black box
problems, we do not have efficient procedures for constructing the projection of a
black box onto the (abstract) group it encrypts.
3.2. Shades of black. Polynomial time complexity is an asymptotic concept, to
work with it we need an infinite class of objects. Therefore our theory refers to
some infinite family X of black box groups (X of course varies from one black box
problem to another). For X ∈ X , we denote by l(X) the length of 0–1 strings
representing elements in X. We assume that, for every X ∈ X , basic operations
of generating, multiplying, comparing strings in X can be done in probabilistic
polynomial time in l(X).
We also assume that the lengths logE(X) of global exponents E(X) for X ∈ X
are bounded by a polynomial in l(X).
Morphisms X −→ Y in X are understood as defined in Section 3.1 and their
running times are bounded by a polynomial in l(X) and l(Y).
At the expense of slightly increasing X and its bounds for complexity, we can
include in X a collection of explicitly given “known” finite groups. Indeed, using
standard computer implementations of finite field arithmetic, we can represent every
group Y = GLn(p
k) as an algorithm or computer routine operating on 0–1 strings
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of length l(Y ) = n2kdlog pe. Using standard matrix representations for simple
algebraic groups, we can represent every group of points Y = G(pk) of a reductive
algebraic group G defined over Fpk as a black box Y generating and processing
strings of length l(Y) polynomial in k log p and the Lie rank of Y. Therefore an
“explicitly defined” group can be seen a black box group, perhaps of a lighter shade
of black.
We feel that the best way to analyze a black box group X encrypting a finite
group G is by a step-by-step construction of a chain of morphisms
G ff......... X ffff X1 ffff X2 ffff · · · ffff Xn ffff G
at each step changing the shade of black and increasing the amount of information
provided by the black boxes Xi.
Figure 1. M.C. Escher, Day and Night, 1938
Step-by-step transformation of black boxes into “white boxes” and their complex
entanglement is captured well by Escher’s famous woodcut, Figure 1.
3.3. Randomized algorithms: Monte Carlo and Las Vegas. This is a brief
reminder of two canonical concepts for the benefit of those readers who do not come
from a computational group theory background.
A Monte-Carlo algorithm is a randomized algorithm which gives a correct output
to a decision problem with probability strictly bigger than 1/2. The probability
of having incorrect output can be made arbitrarily small by running the algorithm
sufficiently many times. A Monte-Carlo algorithm with outputs “yes” and “no” is
called one-sided if the output “yes” is always correct.
A special subclass of Monte-Carlo algorithm is a Las Vegas algorithm which
either outputs a correct answer or reports failure (the latter with probability less
than 1/2). The probability of having a report of failure is prescribed by the user. A
detailed comparison of Monte-Carlo and Las Vegas algorithms, both from practical
and theoretical point, can be found in Babai’s paper [1].
In our setup, Las Vegas makes no sense unless we are given additional information
about X 99K G, for example
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• generators x1, . . . , xk of X, or
• the order of G, or
• the isomorphism type of G.
This additional information is frequently available in applications. Even so, it
is frequently more practical and therefore preferable to recover the structure of a
black box group X via a sequence of morphisms
G ff.........
pi
X ffff
µ1
X1 ffff
µ2 · · · ffffµn Xn ffffµn+1 G
X
Id??
λ -- G
Id
66
with
• crude but fast Monte Carlo morphisms µi for 1 6 i 6 n+ 1, and
• a Las Vegas morphism λ;
then everything becomes Las Vegas.
Using a “real world” simile, we prefer to apply to black box groups the well-
known First Law of Metalworking : use the roughest file first, see Figure 2.
Figure 2. Relative tooth sizes for smooth, second cut, and bastard
files. There are six different cuts altogether defined as (from rough-
est to smoothest): rough, middle, bastard, second cut, smooth, and
dead smooth. Source: Wikipedia.
Even in relatively simple black box problems we may end up dealing with a
sophisticated category of black boxes and their morphisms—this is emphasized in
the title of this paper.
4. Black box fields
A black box (finite) field K is an oracle or an algorithm operating on 0-1 strings of
uniform length (input length), l(K), which encrypts a field of known characteristic
p. The oracle produces random elements from K in probabilistic time polynomial
in l(K), computes x+ y, xy, x−1 (for x 6= 0) and decides whether x = y for strings
x, y ∈ K. We refer the reader to [7, 40] for more details on black box fields and
their applications to cryptography.
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In this and subsequent paper, we shall be using some results about the isomor-
phism problem of black box fields [40], that is, the problem of constructing an
isomorphism and its inverse between K and an explicitly given finite field Fpn . The
explicit data for a finite field of cardinality pn is defined to be a system of struc-
ture constants over the prime field, that is n3 elements (cijk)
n
i,j,k=1 of the prime
field Fp = Z/pZ (represented as integers in [0, p − 1]) so that Fpn becomes a field
with ordinary addition and multiplication by elements of Fp, and multiplication
determined by
sisj =
n∑
k=1
cijksk,
where s1, s2, . . . , sn denotes a basis of Fpn over Fp. The concept of an explicitly
given field of order pn is robust; indeed, Lenstra Jr. has shown in [38, Theorem 1.2]
that for any two fields A and B of order pn given by two sets of structure constants
(aijk)
n
i,j,k=1 and (bijk)
n
i,j,k=1 an isomorphism A −→ B can be constructed in time
polynomial in n log p.
Maurer and Raub [40] proved that the cost of constructing an isomorphism be-
tween a black box field K and an explicitly given field Fpn is reducible in polynomial
time to the same problem for the prime subfield in K and Fp.
Using our terminology, their proof can be reformulated to yield the following
result.
Theorem 4.1. Let K and L be black box fields encrypting the same finite field
and K0, L0 their prime subfield. Then a morphism
K0 −→ L0
can be extended, with the help of polynomial time construction, to a morphism
K −→ L.
Obviously, if char K = p, we always have a morphism Fp −→ K0. The existence
of the reverse morphism would follow from solution of the discrete logarithm prob-
lem in K0. In particular, this means that, for small primes p, any two black box
fields of the same order pn are effectively isomorphic.
5. Automorphisms
5.1. Automorphisms as lighter shades of black. The first application of the
“shades of black” philosophy is the following self-evident theorem which explains
how an automorphism of a group can be added to a black box encrypting this
group.
Theorem 5.1. Let X be a black box group encrypting a finite group G and assume
that each of k tuples of strings
x˜(i) = (x
(i)
1 , . . . , x
(i)
m ), i = 1, . . . , k,
generate X in the sense that the projections pi
(
x
(i)
1
)
, . . . , pi
(
x
(i)
m
)
generate G. As-
sume that the map
pi : x
(i)
j 7→ pi(x(i+1 mod k)j ), i = 0, . . . , k − 1, j = 1, . . . ,m,
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can be extended to an automorphism a ∈ AutG of order k. The black box group Y
generated in Xk by the strings
x¯j =
(
x
(0)
j , x
(1)
j , . . . , x
(k−1)
j
)
, j = 1, . . . ,m,
encrypts G via the canonical projection on the first component
(y0, . . . , yk−1) 7→ pi(yo),
and possess an additional unary operation, cyclic shift
α : Y −→ Y
(y0, y1, . . . , yk−2, yk−1) 7→ (y1, y2, . . . , yk−1, y0)
which encrypts the automorphism a of G in the sense that the following diagram
commutes:
Y
α-- Y
G
?
.........
..........
a
- G
?
.........
A somewhat more precise formulation of Theorem 5.1 is that we can construct,
in time polynomial in k and m, k commutative diagrams
(1)
X ffff
{pii }06i6k−1
Xk ff
δ ⊃ Y .........
α
- Y
G
?
.........
ff........................
{ pi }1606k−1
Gk
?
........
ff........
d
G
?
.........
..........
a
- G
?
.........
where d is the twisted diagonal embedding
d : G −→ Gk
x 7→ (x, xa, xa2 , xak−1),
and pi is the projection
pi : G
k −→ G
(g0, . . . , gi, . . . , gk−1) 7→ gi.
Of course, this construction leads to memory requirements increasing by a factor
of k, but, as our subsequent papers [16, 17] show, this is price worth paying. After
all, in most practical problems the value of k is not that big, in most interesting
cases k = 2. Also, direct powers of black boxes appear to be very suitable for
resorting to parallel computation [5, 6].
5.2. Amalgamation of local automorphisms. A useful special case of Theo-
rem 5.1 is the following result about amalgamation of black box automorphisms,
stated here in an informal wording rather than expressed by a formal commutative
diagram.
Theorem 5.2. Let X be a black box group encrypting a group G. Assume that
G contains subgroups G1, . . . , Gl invariant under an automorphism α ∈ AutG and
that these subgroups are encrypted in X as black boxes Xi, i = 1, . . . , l, supplied
with morphisms
φi : Xi −→ Xi
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which encrypt restrictions α |Gi of α on Gi. Assume also that 〈Gi, i = 1, . . . , l〉 = G.
Then we can construct, in time polynomial in l(X), a morphism φ : X −→ X which
encrypts α.
We shall say in this situation that the automorphism φ is obtained by amalga-
mation of local automorphisms φi.
We can generalize Theorem 5.1 even further.
Theorem 5.3. Let X be a black box group encrypting a group G. Assume that G
contains subgroups G1, . . . , Gl mapped by an automorphism α ∈ AutG to H1, . . . ,Hl,
respectively, and that these subgroups are encrypted in X as black boxes Yi,Zi,
i = 1, . . . , l, supplied with morphisms
φi : Yi −→ Zi
which encrypt restrictions
α |Gi : Gi −→ Hi.
Set Y = 〈Yi, i = 1, . . . , l〉 and Z = 〈Zi, i = 1, . . . , l〉. Then we can construct, in
time polynomial in l(X), a morphism
φ : Y −→ Z
which encrypts the restriction of α to 〈Gi, i = 1, . . . , l〉.
Theorem 5.3 will be used in the proof of Theorem 8.1 and 8.2, and also in the
proof of Theorem 9.1 in [16].
6. Construction of Frobenius maps
We now use Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 to construct a Frobenius map on a black box
group X encrypting (P)SL2(q).
We give a brief description of a Curtis-Tits system for groups of Lie type of
rank at least 3 which is used in the proof of Theorems 6.1, 8.1 and 8.2 below. A
Curtis-Tits system of a group G = G(q) of Lie type of rank n is a set {K1, . . . ,Kn}
of root SL2(q)-subgroups of G where each Ki corresponds to a node in the Dynkin
diagram of G. The realtions between Ki and Kj , i 6= j, are determined by the
bonds connecting the nodes, that is, if there is no bond, then [Ki,Kj ] = 1; if there
is a single or double bonds, then 〈Ki,Kj〉 ∼= SL3(q) or (P)Sp4(q), respectively, see
[11, 12] for more details.
Theorem 6.1 (Known characteristic). Let X be a black box group encrypting a
simple Lie type group G = G(q) of untwisted type over a field of order q = pk for p
odd (and known) and k > 1. Then we can construct, in time polynomial in log |G|,
• a black box Y encrypting G,
• a morphism X←− Y, and
• a morphism φ : Y −→ Y which encrypts a Frobenius automorphism of G
induced by the map x 7→ xp on the field Fq.
Proof. The proof is based on two applications of Theorem 5.2. First we consider
the case when X encrypts PSL2(q). Using the standard technique for dealing with
involution centralizers, we can find in X a 4-subgroup V ; let E be the subgroup in
G = PSL2(q) encrypted by V . Since all 4-subgroups in PSL2(q) are conjugate to a
subgroup in PSL2(p), we can assume without loss of generality that E belongs to a
subfield subgroup H = PSL2(p) of G and therefore E is centralized by a Frobenius
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map F on G. Now let e1 and e2 be two involutions in E, and C1 and C2 maximal
cyclic subgroups in their centralizers in G; notice that C1 and C2 are conjugate by
an element from H and are F -invariant.
It follows from basic Galois cohomology considerations that F acts on C1 and
C2 as power maps αi : c 7→ cp for p ≡  mod 4,  = ±1. If now we take images Xi
of groups Ci, we see that the morphisms φi : x 7→ xp of Xi encrypt restrictions of
F to Ci. Obviously, X1 and X2 generate a black box Y −→ X, and we can use
Theorem 5.2 to amalgamate φ1 and φ2 into a morphism φ which encrypts F .
As usual, for groups SL2(q) the same result can be achieved by essentially the
same arguments as for PSL2(q). Moving to other untwisted Chevalley groups, we
apply amalgamation to (encryptions of) restrictions of a Frobenius map on G to
(encryptions in X) of a family of root (P)SL2-subgroups Ki in G forming a Curtis-
Tits system in G (and therefore generating G). Black boxes for Curtis-Tits system
in classical groups of odd characteristic are constructed in [11], in exceptional groups
in [14]. This completes the proof. 
7. Reification of involutions
Another application of Theorem 5.1 is a simple, but powerful procedure which
we call “reification of involutions”.
7.1. From amalgamation of local automorphisms to reification of involu-
tions. Let G be a finite group, a ∈ AutG an automorphism of order 2 and H 6 G
an a-invariant subgroup. We say that the action of a on H is clean if a either
centralizes H or inverts every elements in H.
The following theorem is partly a special case and partly an easy corollary of
the amalgamation of local automorphisms, Theorems 5.2 and 5.3.
Theorem 7.1. Let X be a black box group encrypting a finite group G. Assume
that G admits an involutive automorphism a ∈ AutG and contains a-invariant
subgroups H1, . . . ,Hn with a clean action of a on each of them.
Assume also that we are given black boxes Y1, . . . ,Yn encrypting subgroups
H1, . . . ,Hn. Then we can construct, in polynomial time,
• a black box for the structure {Y, α }, where Y encrypts H = 〈H1, . . . ,Hn〉
and α encrypts the restriction of a |H of a to H;
• a black box subgroup Z covering Ω1(Z(CH(a))), the subgroup generated by
involutions from Z(CH(a));
• if, in addition, the automorphism a ∈ G and H = G then α is induced by
one of the involutions in Z.
Notice that in many situations (in particular, when G is a Lie type group of odd
characteristic), Z is small, and identification of α in Z is easy.
The full strength of reification of involutions will become obvious in [15].
7.2. Kantor’s and Kassabov’s construction of involutions in SL2(2
n). The
construction of involutions in SL2(2
n) as done by Bill Kantor and Martin Kassabov
[33] is the special case of reification of involutions.
Indeed, let X be a black box group encrypting SL2(q) with q = 2
n.
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7.2.1. First construction. Tori of order q− 1 in X are pointwise stabilisers of pairs
of points on the projective line over Fq. Let g and h be two elements of odd orders
dividing q − 1, and assume [g, h] 6= 1. If both g and h are contained in the same
Borel subgroup of X then [g, h] belongs to its unipotent radical and is therefore an
involution.
Borel subgroups are stabilisers of points on the projective line. If g and h do not
belong to the same Borel subgroup, they belong to some tori S and T whose pairs
of fixed points are disjoint, say, a, b and c, d. Since X acts sharply 3-transitively on
the projective line, there is a unique element w in X that maps
a 7→ b, b 7→ a, c 7→ d;
since this permutation contains a 2-cycle (a, b), it is of even order and is therefore
an involution. Now w is an involution that inverts S and T and can therefore be
reified by Theorem 7.1, thus becoming the desired involution. 
7.2.2. A shorter construction. However there is a shortcut in the construction
above. Take f = gh and observe that
fw = gwhw = g−1h−1;
for this calculation, we do not need w as such, its role as a “virtual” involution
suffices.
We know that
ζ(f) = f · √g · gw = gh ·
√
ghg−1h−1
belongs to CX(w); but the latter is a 2-group, therefore it is an involution or 1. But
gh ·
√
ghg−1h−1 = 1
quickly yields gh = hg, which is excluded by our initial choice of g and h. Hence
ζ(f) is the desired involution. 
8. The inverse-transpose map
In this section, we use Theorems 5.1 and 5.3 to construct the inverse-transpose
map on G = (P)SLn(q), q odd.
8.1. Construction of the inverse-transposed map.
Theorem 8.1. Let X be a black box group encrypting G = (P)SLn(q), q odd. Then
we can construct, in time polynomial in log |G|, a morphism
X
ϕ-- X
that encrypts an inverse-transpose map composed with some inner automorphism
of G.
Proof. We will prove the result for the black box groups encrypting SLn(q), q odd
and the result follows from the same arguments for PSLn(q).
The key observation is that inverse-transpose map is an inner automorphism of
SL2(q) but not for SLn(q) for n ≥ 3.
Let G = SL2(q) and w =
[
0 1
−1 0
]
. Then, conjugation by w is the inverse-
transpose map of G. Note that w is a Weyl group element corresponding to the
diagonal subgroup T (split torus) of G, that is, w inverts T . In general, the Weyl
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group elements corresponding to T are of the form wt =
[
0 t
−t−1 0
]
for some t ∈ F∗q .
Notice that conjugation by wt is the composition of the inverse-transpose map with
an inner automorphism associated to the diagonal element
[
t 0
0 t−1
]
.
Let G ∼= SLn(q), {K1, . . . ,Kn−1} be a Curtis-Tits system of G and T be the
maximal split torus of G normalizing Ki for each i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Assume also
that wi ∈ Ki be Weyl group elements which inverts the tori Ti = T ∩Ki for each
i = 1, . . . , n− 1. Then amalgamation on {K1, . . . ,Kn−1} the maps
Ki
ϕi-- Ki,
where each ϕi is a conjugation by wi on Ki, are conjugate to an inverse-transpose
map of Ki.
A construction of a Curtis-Tits system {K1, . . . ,Kn−1} of a black box group
X encrypting SLn(q) is presented in [11] and the construction of the tori Ti and
T = 〈T1, . . . ,Tn−1〉 together with Weyl group elements wi ∈ Ki inverting Ti is
presented in [12]. Since X is generated by {K1, . . . ,Kn−1}, applying amalgamation
to the conjugation by wi ∈ Ki, we have an automorphism of X which encrypts the
inverse transpose map composed with some inner automorphism of G. 
8.2. An application: SUn(q) ↪→ SLn(q2). We apply our arguments for the con-
struction of SUn(q) inside SLn(q
2). We note that the centralizer of inverse transpose
map composed with Frobenius map in SLn(q
2) is the subgroup SUn(q).
Theorem 8.2 (Known characteristic). Let X be a black box group encrypting the
group SLn(q
2) for q odd, q = pk for some k (perhaps unknown) and a known prime
number p. Then we can construct, in time polynomial in log q and n, a black box
group Y encrypting the group SUn(q) and a morphism Y ↪→ X.
An important feature of the proof of this theorem (and other similar results in
[16]) is that they never refer to the ground fields of the groups and do not involve any
computations with unipotent elements. In fact, we interpret morphisms between
functors
SUn(·) ↪→ SLn(·2).
within our black boxes. At a practical level, it means that given a black box group
encrypting SL3(p
2) for a 60 decimal digits long prime number p, say
p = 622288097498926496141095869268883999563096063592498055290461
(one of the examples run in GAP on a pretty old and underpowered laptop com-
puter), we can construct a black box subgroup
SU3(p) ↪→ SL3(p2).
This example shows that a modicum of categorical language is useful for the
theory as well as for its implementation in the code since it suggests a natural
structural approach to development of the computer code.
Proof of Theorem 8.2. Let {K1, . . . ,Kn−1} be a Curtis-Tits system for X. Assume
also that, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, Ti is a maximal split torus of Ki where
〈T1, . . . ,Tn−1〉 encrypts a maximal split torus of G normalizing each Ki, and wi ∈
Ki are the Weyl group elements, that is, wi inverts Ti. Furthermore, set Wi =
CKi(wi) and Twi is the maximal torus in Wi for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1.
BLACK BOX, WHITE ARROW 15
Let φi denote the restriction of the Frobenius map on Ki.
Since the inverse transpose map is amalgamated over the conjugation by Weyl
group elements wi, the inverse transpose map inverts Ti and fixes Twi . Moreover
the restriction of the Frobenius map φi acts on Ti and Twi as x 7→ xq for q ≡
 mod 4,  = ±1. Therefore, the centralizer of wi ◦ φi consists of the elements from
Ki satisfying
t = t−q or, equivalently tq+1 = 1 for t ∈ Ti,
and
t = tq or, equivalently tq−1 = 1 for t ∈ Twi .
Since Ki = 〈Ti,Twi〉, we can compute Ci := CKi(wi ◦ φi). Moreover, since
X = 〈K1, . . . ,Kn−1〉, amalgamation over Ci gives the subgroup encrypting the
fixed points of the inverse transpose map composed with Frobenius map which is
isomorphic to SUn(q). 
9. Structure recovery
In this section, we revise the classification of black box group problems and
outline our vision of the hierarchy of typical black box group problems.
9.1. The hierarchy of black box problems.
Verification Problem: Is the unknown group encrypted by a black box
group X isomorphic to the given group G (“target group”)?
Recognition Problem: Determine the isomorphism class of the group en-
crypted by X.
The Verification Problem arises as a sub-problem within more complicated Recog-
nition Problems. The two problems have dramatically different complexity. For
example, the celebrated Miller-Rabin algorithm [45] for testing primality of the
given odd number n is simply a black box algorithm for solving the verification
problem for the multiplicative group Z/nZ∗ of residues modulo n (given by a sim-
ple black box: take your favorite random numbers generator and generate random
integers between 1 and n) and the cyclic group Z/(n − 1)Z of order n − 1 as the
target group. On the other hand, if n = pq is the product of primes p and q, the
recognition problem for the same black box group means finding the direct product
decomposition
Z/nZ∗ ∼= (Z/(p− 1)Z)⊕ (Z/(q − 1)Z)
which is equivalent to factorization of n into product of primes.
The next step after finding the isomorphism type of the black box group X is
Constructive Recognition: Suppose that a black box group X encrypts a
concrete and explicitly given group G. Rewording a definition given in [21],
The goal of a constructive recognition algorithm is to construct an
effective isomorphism Ψ : G −→ X. That is, given g ∈ G, there
is an efficient procedure to construct a string Ψ(g) encrypting g
in X and given a string x produced by X, there is an efficient
procedure to construct the element Ψ−1(x) ∈ G encrypted by X.
However, there are still no really efficient constructive recognition algorithms for
black box groups X of (known) Lie type over a finite field of large order q = pk. The
first computational obstacles for known algorithms [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 37] are
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the need to construct unipotent elements in black box groups, [19, 20, 21, 23, 22, 24]
or to solve discrete logarithm problem for matrix groups [26, 27, 37].
Unfortunately, the probability that the order of a random element is divisible by
p is O(1/q) [30], so one has to make O(q) (that is, exponentially many, in terms of
the input length O(log q) of the black boxes and the algorithms) random selections
of elements in a given group to construct a unipotent element. However, this brute
force approach is still working for small values of q, and Kantor and Seress [34]
used it to develop an algorithm for recognition of black box classical groups. Later
the algorithms of [34] were upgraded to polynomial time constructive recognition
algorithms [20, 21, 22, 23] by assuming the availability of additional oracles:
• the discrete logarithm oracle in F∗q , and
• the SL2(q)-oracle.
Here, the SL2(q)-oracle is a procedure for constructive recognition of SL2(q); see
discussion in [21, Section 3].
We emphasize that in this and subsequent papers we are
using neither the discrete logarithm oracle in F∗q nor the
SL2(q)-oracle.
9.2. Structure recovery. Suppose that a black box group X encrypts a concrete
and explicitly given group G = G(Fq) of Chevalley type G over a explicitly given fi-
nite field Fq. To achieve structure recovery in X means to construct, in probabilistic
polynomial time in log |G|,
• a black box field K encrypting Fq, and
• a probabilistic polynomial time morphism
Ψ : G(K) −→ X.
We extend our definition from [12] where it refers to a special case of the present
one.
An example of a structure recovery is presented in our next paper [15] for black
box groups (P)SL2(q).
9.3. Separation of flesh from bones. Recall that simple algebraic groups (in
particular, Chevalley groups over finite fields) are understood in the theory of al-
gebraic groups as functors from the category of unital commutative rings into the
category of groups; most structural properties of a Chevalley group are encoded in
the functor; the field mostly provides the flesh on the bones.
A “category-theoretical” approach allows us to carry out constructions like the
following one.
Theorem 9.1 (Known characteristic [16]). Let X be a black box group encrypting
the group SL8(F ) for a field F of (unknown) odd order q = p
k but known p = charF .
Then we can construct, in time polynomial in log |F |, a chain of black box groups
and morphisms
U ↪→ V ↪→W ↪→ X
that encrypts the chain of canonical embeddings
G2(F ) ↪→ SO7(F ) ↪→ SO+8 (F ) ↪→ SL8(F ).
BLACK BOX, WHITE ARROW 17
Again, these constructions (and even the embedding
3D4(q) ↪→ SO+8 (q3),
also done in [16]) are “field-free” and, moreover, “characteristic-free”.
Another aspect of the concept of “structure recovery” is that it follows an im-
portant technique from model-theoretic algebra: interpretability of one algebraic
structure in another, see, for example, [10]. Construction of a black box field in a
black box group in [15] closely follows this model-theoretic paradigm.
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